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ALD-140        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-4332 
 ___________ 
 
 VIRGIL HALL,  
   Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN LORETTO FCI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3:13-cv-00217) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 6, 2014 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: February 18, 2014) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Federal prisoner Virgil Hall appeals pro se from the denial of his habeas petition 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
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affirm. 
I. 
 In 2011, the United States District Court for the District of Utah (“the sentencing 
court”) sentenced Hall to 120 months’ imprisonment following his conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed that judgment, see United States v. Hall, 508 F. App’x 776, 780 
(10th Cir. 2013), and the United State Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2013. 
 In September 2013, Hall, who was (and still is) incarcerated at the Federal 
Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania (“FCI-Loretto”), filed a pro se § 2241 
petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (“the 
District Court”).  He claimed that he was being falsely imprisoned in violation of the 
Constitution and other authority.  This claim revolved around his allegation that the 
sentencing court’s judgment and commitment order had not been properly executed 
because the “return” section of that order — where the United States Marshal or a Deputy 
United States Marshal attests that the defendant has been delivered to the Bureau of 
Prisons with a certified copy of the judgment — was not completed.  Hall appeared to 
argue that he should be released from custody unless the warden of FCI-Loretto could 
show that the judgment and commitment order had, in fact, been properly executed.   
 The District Court referred Hall’s petition to a United States Magistrate Judge, 
who recommended that the petition be denied.  The Magistrate Judge stated:  
any lack of completion of the Return is not a clerical error 
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[that may be remedied under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 36] nor does it confer any right on the sentenced 
inmate.  Hall does not contend that the [judgment and 
commitment order] does not accurately reflect his sentence of 
120 months. 
 
(Mag. J. Report 2.)  The District Court, over Hall’s objections, adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation and denied the petition.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
  We review 
the District Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo, exercising plenary review over the 
court’s legal conclusions and reviewing its findings of fact for clear error.  See Vega v. 
United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We may take summary action if an 
appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Because Hall challenges the execution of his sentence — he is not collaterally 
attacking the sentencing court’s imposition of the sentence — this challenge was properly 
brought under § 2241.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  That said, we agree with the District Court that no relief under § 2241 is 
warranted in this case.  Hall has not cited, nor have we located, any authority for the 
proposition that, where the United States Marshal (or his or her deputy) does not 
complete the “return” section of a defendant’s judgment and commitment order, the 
                                              
1
 Hall does not need to obtain a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal.  
See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012). 
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defendant’s confinement is unlawful and he must be released.2 
 We have considered the various arguments that Hall raised in the District Court 
and in his “Summary Action Response,” and we conclude that none warrants disturbing 
the District Court’s denial of habeas relief.  Because this appeal does not present a 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
2
 Hall’s citing Strickland v. United States, 339 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1965), and Mullican v. 
United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958), does not bolster his claim.  Not only are 
those cases not binding on this Court, but they also are distinguishable from this case.  
Those cases concerned challenges to convictions under the Federal Escape Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 751, not whether an inmate’s current confinement was unlawful because the judgment 
and commitment order’s “return” section was not completed.  See Strickland, 339 F.2d at 
867; Mullican, 252 F.2d at 399-400.  Although Strickland did discuss a judgment and 
commitment order that had no endorsed “return” section, it did so in the context of 
determining whether the prosecution had met its burden of showing, under § 751, that the 
defendant was confined by virtue of a conviction at the time he attempted his escape.  See 
339 F.2d at 867-68.   
